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In emerging stock markets, the issue of stock price manipulation by intermediaries
often arises. Numerous accounts of emerging stock markets today share this concern.
Khwaja and Mian (2005) use a unique trade level dataset to show that when market
intermediaries (brokers) in a Pakistani stock exchange trade on their own behalf, they
earn at least 50 to 90 percentage points higher annual returns, and these abnormal
returns are earned at the expense of outside investors. Zhou and Mei (2003) note that
China’s worst stock market crime was the result of a scheme implemented in collusion
with brokers. They argue that manipulation by brokers is common in many emerging
stock markets. Khanna and Sunder (1999), in a case study of the Indian stock market,
state that “brokers were often accused of collaborating with the company owners to rig
share prices in pump and dump schemes”. Furthermore, according to a survey conducted
by the Times of India in October 2005, a majority of market participants in India believe
that brokers manipulate prices. In fact, in 2005, the Securities and Exchange Board of
India barred 11 brokers for engaging in price manipulation.
A number of studies have examined the issue of stock price manipulation by
speculators who are not in the role of intermediaries. Allen and Gale (1992) show that
it is possible for an uninformed trader to manipulate prices if the investors attach a
positive probability to the manipulator being an informed player. Jarrow (1992) and
Hart (1977) have analyzed manipulation in a dynamic asset pricing context and show
that under certain conditions speculators can make profits. However, a theoretical
framework for understanding manipulation when the manipulator is in the role of an
intermediary is lacking, even though anecdotes abound. Consequently, a number of
key questions remain unanswered. Firstly, anecdotal manipulation schemes involving
brokers such as the pump and dump1  schemes require a continuous supply of irrational
investors who, like sheep, follow each other only to be slaughtered. Assuming a relentless
supply of irrational investors who keep on placing themselves at the mercy of manipulating
brokers, especially when the stakes are very high, seems unreasonable. Secondly,
reputation is a key asset in a market where brokers compete for business. How can
manipulating brokers, if they indeed manipulate, maintain their credibility (reputation)
and clientele in the face of competition from other brokers? Thirdly, mature markets
do not seem to suffer from the manipulation schemes typically associated with emerging
markets.2 What allows mature markets to function seemingly free of this type of
manipulation?
In this paper, we present a market microstructure model, which uses a 3-player
coordination game set-up developed in Han Joon (2007). This paper should be thought
of as an initial attempt at understanding the systematic price manipulation by brokers.
Specifically, it provides several simple models in which an intermediary can successfully
1
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3See Khwaja and Mian (2005)
2Aggarwal and Wu (2006) present evidence of stock market manipulations in the United States. Their data
suggests that manipulators are plausibly brokers.
3This assumption is in accordance with a Keynesian beauty contest.  Keynesian beauty contest is a concept
developed by John Maynard Keynes and introduced in Chapter 12 of his book, General Theory of
Employment Interest and Money (1936), to explain price fluctuations in equity markets. The Keynesian
beauty contest is the view that investment is impacted by expectations about what other investors think,
rather than expectations about the fundamental profitability of a particular investment. Keynes observed
that investment strategies resembled a contest in a London newspaper of his day that featured pictures of
a hundred or so young women. The winner of the contest was the newspaper reader who submitted a list
of the top five women that most clearly matched the consensus of all other contest entries. A naïve strategy
for an entrant would be to rely on his or her own concepts of beauty to establish rankings. A better strategy
for each contest entrant would be to try to second guess the other entrants’ reactions. Instead of judging
the beauty of people, substitute alternative investments. Each potential entrant (investor) now ignores
fundamental value (i.e., expected profitability based on expected revenues and costs), instead trying to
predict “what the market will do.”
manipulate demand in equilibrium without losing credibility. The models presented
here are general and are not limited to emerging markets; hence they provide conditions
under which manipulation is checked. Those conditions are more likely to be met in
developed markets.
In the basic model, there are three players, an individual investor, an institutional
investor, and a stock broker. There is a positive probability that the institutional investor
has superior information. If it does, then it trades accordingly. However, if it does not,
then it prefers to mimic the individual investor. The individual investor never has
superior information so (s)he always prefers to mimic the institutional investor. That
is, in the absence of superior information, both types of investors prefer to follow each
other.3  The individual investor does not observe the type of the institutional investor,
however, the broker does. The broker, whose primary preference is to preserve its
credibility (which will be lost if the individual investor determines that the broker has
lied), sends a signal about the intentions of the institutional investor to the individual
investor. The conditional preference of the broker is to manipulate demand. After the
signal has been received and has become public knowledge, both types of investors
choose their demand levels simultaneously. The main result is that if the institutional
investor does not have superior information, then the broker can manipulate demand
in equilibrium while maintaining its credibility. Two features of this model must be
noted. Firstly, the institutional investor is assumed to have superior information with
positive probability. This is a common assumption in financial market literature, often
justified by appealing to the superior resources (both material and human) that an
institutional investor has for market research. Secondly, in the absence of superior
information, it is assumed that both types of investors prefer to follow each other. This
assumption is in the spirit of Keynesian beauty contest. Keynes (1936) compared the
stock markets to newspaper beauty contests in which the prize goes to the reader whose
choice most resembles the average pick.  In stock markets, a similar phenomenon is
observed since the price of a stock depends on the average market belief about that
stock. If everybody believes that the stock price will go up, then it goes up, and a person
betting in the opposite direction loses terribly. So, unless there is sufficient reason
(superior information) to justify a lone sail, it is preferable to follow others.
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4Of course, investing with caution implies investing less money compared to investing with optimism.
In this model, what the broker signals affects its payoffs. This property distinguishes
it from the cheap talk games of Farrel and Gibbons (1989a), Farrell and Rabin (1996),
Battaglini (2002), Farrell and Gibbons (1989b), Stein (1989), Baliga and Morris (2002),
and Aumann and Hart (2003) since in cheap talks, signals do not matter for payoffs
so the receivers do not have to believe what the senders say. Here, the broker’s payoff
depends on its report as well as the actions of the other players. This is done by assuming
that the broker wants to preserve its credibility by accurately forecasting the actions
of the institutional investor. Ironically, this intention of the sender for its credibility
deprives the investors of their favorite outcome. In addition, the present model differs
from the signaling games developed by Spence (1973), Cho and Kreps (1987), and van
Damme (1989) in that the broker reports about the intentions of another player (the
institutional investor). In signaling games, senders signal their own types or their own
intention about their future actions (see also Bhattacharya (1979); Milgrom and Roberts
(1986); Banks and Sobel (1987); Manelli (1997)).
The model is then enriched to allow for competition between brokers and to allow
for a specific broker bias. Conditions are specified under which manipulation is mitigated.
Compared to mature markets, those conditions are much less likely to hold in emerging
markets. Hence, as predicted by the model, broker manipulation anecdotes abound in
emerging markets and not much so in mature markets.
The Basic Model
The basic model has a 3-player coordination game framework as in Han Joon (2007).
Here, the three players are the individual investor (S), the institutional investor (L),
and the stock broker (B). S and L have their own types. L can be optimistic, neutral,
or pessimistic. S is always neutral. The optimistic type has superior information that
the market will go up so it prefers to invest with optimism (I). The pessimistic type has
superior information that the market will go down so it prefers not to invest (N), and
the neutral type does not have superior information either way so its primary preference
is to mimic the other player and the secondary preference is to invest with caution (C).4
The following inequalities describe the preference of optimistic and pessimistic types
of L:
(1)
(2)
These inequalities show that the optimistic type of L prefers to play I irrespective
of what S does and the pessimistic type of L prefers to play N irrespective of what S
does.
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The following inequality describes the primary preference of neutral type of L:
(3)
This inequality shows that a neutral type of L prefers outcomes in which its actions
are matched by S over outcomes in which its actions are not matched by S.
The secondary preference of neutral type of L:
(4)
This inequality shows that conditional on successfully mimicking S, the neutral
type of L prefers to play C over I or N.
The following inequalities describe the primary and secondary preference of S
respectively (S is always of type neutral):
 (5)
 
(6)
The probability of L being optimistic is , of being pessimistic is ,
and the probability of being neutral is  . In this model, uncertainty is only
about the type of institutional investor. The broker reports on the institutional investor’s
intention. That is, either it’s going to invest with optimism (I), or invest with caution
(C) or that it will not invest (N).
This game proceeds as follows. At stage zero, Nature chooses L’s type. Only L and
B detect L’s type. At stage one, B reports either I, C, or N to S. What B has reported
becomes common knowledge. At stage 2, both S and L simultaneously choose I, C,
or N. After all the actions are taken, payoffs are realized.
Regarding preferences, the broker has a primary preference for maintaining its
credibility in the eyes of the individual investor and a secondary preference for
manipulating individual investor’s demand. The broker will lose credibility if it fails
to correctly forecast the actions of the institutional investor. Suppose B says L will
invest with optimism (play I), however, if L does not actually play I then B will lose
its credibility in the eyes of S. That is, whenever the broker turns out to be wrong, it
will lose its credibility; an outcome that the broker would want to avoid. The broker’s
objective is to manipulate demand while correctly forecasting the actions of the
institutional investor so that its credibility will not be lost in the eyes of the individual
investor.
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The following inequality describes the broker’s primary preference of credibility:
 (7)
Here ,  is the payoff to B if B signals I, S plays C, and L plays I. Other entries
in the above inequality are similarly read.
Conditional on meeting its primary preference (of being right in predicting L’s
action), B prefers outcomes in which the individual investor follows its signal (so that
B can manipulate). This is described in the following inequality:
 (8)
In the absence of B, it is easy to see that there is one pure-strategy-- Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium if L’s type is optimistic in which both S and L play I. Similarly, if L’s type
is pessimistic; both S and L play N in equilibrium.  If L is neutral then the game in the
absence of B has three pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria. They are both play
I, both play C, and both play N. CC (both play C) outcome is preferred by both players.
How does introducing B in this game change the outcomes? Theorem 1 provides an
answer.
Theorem 1 Pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria exist and, in the absence of
superior information, the broker can manipulate equilibrium outcomes without losing
its credibility with respect to accurate forecasting.
Proof.  Here every pure strategy of each player is examined. L observes both the
nature’s move (its own type) as well as B’s signal. Each type of L has 27 strategies;
however, for the optimistic type 26 strategies are dominated by the strategy I since an
optimistic type always prefers to play I (inequality 1). Similarly, for the pessimistic
type 26 strategies are dominated by the strategy N since a pessimistic type always
prefers to play N (inequality2). That leaves us with 27 undominated strategies for the
neutral type of L and 1 undominated strategy each for other types of L.
B observes nature’s move. B has 27 pure strategies. 24 of them are eliminated by
iterated dominance since B cares about correctly forecasting the actions of L (inequality
7) and optimistic type of L always plays I and the pessimistic type of L always plays
N.  We are left with 3 pure strategies for B.
Next, if B signals C, and both S and L play either I or N then B would have an
incentive to deviate (inequality 7) implying that a strategy combination in which B
signals C, and both S and L play either I or N in response cannot be an equilibrium.
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By inspection, we arrive at the following pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria:
Note that in all equilibria, when B signals I, both S and L play I and when B signals
N, both S and L play N. In equilibrium (I), B correctly signals the type of L, and S acts
in accordance with the signal. That is, if B signals I, S plays 1, if B signals N, S plays
N and if B signals C, S plays C. In the remaining equilibria, B incorrectly signals the
type only when L is neutral. In that case, if B signals I then in the outcome both S and
L play I. However, if B signals N then in the outcome both S and L play N. Hence, in
the absence of superior information (when L is of neutral type) B can manipulate the
equilibrium outcomes without losing its credibility with respect to accurate forecasting.
It is easy to see how a manipulation scheme can work. Suppose L’s type is neutral,
that is, the institutional investor does not have superior information. Suppose that B
wants the stock price to rise (B may have taken a long position on its own account),
it will signal I and in the outcome both S and L will play I. In contrast, if B wants the
stock price to fall (due to a short position), it will signal N and in the outcome both S
and L will play N. This is consistent with Khwaja and Mian (2005), a study that uses
a unique trade level dataset to show that when market intermediaries (brokers) in a
Pakistani stock exchange trade on their own behalf, they earn at least 50 to 90 percentage
points higher annual returns and these abnormal returns are earned at the expense of
outside investors.
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Broker Bias
Brokers make money when people invest in the market. Arguably, brokers have a bias.
They want more investment to come into the market. Next, we introduce this bias in
the model. Specifically, conditional on successfully meeting its primary and secondary
preference, the broker prefers an outcome in which more investment comes into the
market. Consequently, another restriction is added to B’s preference in addition to
inequalities 7 and 8:
(9)
How does this bias change equilibrium? Theorem 2 provides an answer.
Theorem 2. Pure-Strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria exist in which, in the absence
of superior information, the broker can manipulate demand to get its favorite outcome
without losing its credibility with respect to accurate forecasting.
Proof.  By a similar argument as given in the proof of theorem 1, we arrive at the
following pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria:
In these equilibria, if L’s type is neutral, B always signals I and both S and L always
play I in response. Hence, the broker gets its favorite outcome in the absence of superior
information. The secondary preference of investors is not met.
Broker Competition
Next, broker competition is allowed in the model in the form of a second broker.
In the modified model, there are 4 players; two brokers, an individual investor (S), and
an institutional investor (L). At stage zero, nature chooses L’s type. Only L and the
two brokers, B1 and B2, detect L’s type. At stage one, B1 reports either I, C, or N.
What B1 has reported becomes common knowledge. At stage two, B2 reports either
I, C, or N. Again, what B2 has reported becomes common knowledge. At stage 3, both
S and L simultaneously choose I, C, or N. After all the actions are taken, payoffs are
realized.
Regarding brokers’ preferences, just like in the basic model and the broker bias
model, the primary preference of the brokers is to preserve their credibility. The
conditional preference of the brokers depends both on broker bias as well as broker
competition. The individual investor, if it pays attention to brokers’ signals, is additionally
assumed to be conservative, meaning that if the signals conflict than the lesser signal
will be followed by the individual investor. As an example, if B1 signals I and B2 signals
C then the individual investor, if it decides to pay attention to the signals, will act on
C.  The following inequalities describe relevant cases of broker competition:
Severe Competition
In this type of competition, each broker prefers an outcome in which its prediction
holds true whereas the prediction of the other broker is wrong; even if it means that,
as a result of conflicting signals from the brokers, the institutional investors will not
invest. The following inequality describes the relevant cases for B2:
 (10)
Here,   is the payoff to B2 if B1 signals I, B2 signals C, and the institutional
investor plays C. That is, the prediction of B2 holds true whereas the prediction of B1
turns out to be false. Other payoffs of B2 are read similarly.
The following inequality describes the relevant cases for B1:
(11)
Here,  is the payoff to B1 if B1 signals C, B2 signals I and the institutional
investor plays C. That is, the prediction of B1 holds true whereas the prediction of B2
turns out to be false. Other payoffs are read in the same fashion.
Moderate Competition
In this type of competition, each broker prefers an outcome in which its own
prediction turns out to be correct whereas the prediction of the other broker turns out
to be incorrect provided that the institutional investor does not entirely abstain from
the market as a result of signals from the brokers. That is, each broker wants at least
some investment (at least C) from the institutional investor to remain in the market.
This is in contrast with severe competition in which each broker is willing to tolerate
complete abstention of the investor for the sake of being right when the other broker
is wrong.  The following inequalities describe the relevant cases:
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Proof: Start by proposing the following strategy for S:
In this strategy, if both B1 and B2 send the same signal, I, N, or C, S plays I, N, or C
respectively. However, if the signals are in conflict, lesser investment signal is followed
(S is conservative). That is, if B1 signals I but B2 signals C then S plays C (third entry
in the above set).
If L is optimistic then it always play I, if pessimistic then it always plays N. However,
if L is neutral than it prefers to mimic S. Propose the following strategy for neutral L:
In order to figure out the best response of B1, consider the following:
B1 has 27 possible strategies. Its primary preference of credibility eliminates 24 of
them leaving only 3 strategies that are not dominated. These three strategies are:
If nature picks L’s type to be neutral, B1 cannot report I since B2 will then report
C since in moderate competition . Consequently, S and L will play C and
B1 will lose its credibility. Similarly, if L’s type is neutral, B1 cannot report N since
B2 will then report N also, resulting in both investors abstaining from the market.  In
moderate competition, B1 and B2 prefer that at least some investment (at least C) from
L remains in the market. That guarantees that if B1 signals C then B2 will also signal
C.  That leaves only one possible strategy for B1 that can be played in pure strategy
equilibrium:
Given the strategies of the other three players, the best response of B2 is to signal
C if L’s type is neutral and B1 has signaled C or I since in moderate competition
 and . The best response strategy of B2 is:
It is straightforward to see that the proposed strategies for S and L are the best
responses of S and L to each other as well as to B1 and B2. Hence, the strategy profile
considered constitutes Nash equilibrium.
To see that this equilibrium is unique: Since brokers ‘primary preference is credibility,
they will always report truthfully if nature chooses L’s type to be either optimistic or
pessimistic. That means, any strategy in which S ignores broker signals cannot be
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can manipulate outcomes in equilibrium without losing credibility. However, enough
competition has a mitigating effect on manipulation and the investors’ favorite outcome
is realized. Nevertheless, if broker competition exceeds a certain threshold then, in the
absence of superior information, it results in investors abstaining from the market
entirely, so neither the investors nor the brokers get their favorite outcome in this case.
In any case, if the broker bias for more investment dominates, the brokers get their
favorite outcome at the expense of investors. The results indicate that encouraging
broker competition may be a solution to the intermediary manipulation problem in
emerging markets since competition checks broker bias. In this respect, demutualization
of stock exchanges is a step in the right direction.
The results are important for three reasons. Firstly, it is an initial attempt at making
sense of broker manipulation through rational economic models. Manipulation anecdotes
abound, however, a model that predicts manipulation by brokers where all players are
rational is lacking. Secondly, the role of competition in mitigating this type of
manipulation has been highlighted. Competition among brokers reduces manipulation
in these models. Thirdly, brokers make money when people invest in the market. This
built in bias neutralizes competition by providing a powerful incentive for collusion,
a finding with important governance implications.
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Abstract
We set out to study stock price manipulation when the manipulator is in the role
of an intermediary (broker). We find that in the absence of superior information,
the broker can manipulate equilibrium outcomes without losing its credibility with
respect to accurate forecasting. The result extends to the case when the broker
prefers more investment to come into the market. However, when moderate
competition among brokers is introduced, then the investors get a favored outcome.
When competition exceeds a certain threshold, neither the brokers nor the investors
get their respective favored outcomes. In any case, if the broker bias for more
investment dominates competition, the brokers get their favorite outcome at the
expense of investors.
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